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Second Person Impersonal
First,
a familiar quotation; then, some observations related to it. The quotation is
from Joyce; here, Stephen Daedalus distinguishes between lyric, epic, and
dramatic forms on the basis of the emotional distance of the poet from the
object of emotion. According to him:
The
lyrical form is in fact the simplest verbal vesture of an instant of emotion, a
rhythmical cry such as ages ago cheered on the man who pulled at the oar or
dragged stones up a slope. He who utters it is more conscious of the instant of
emotion than of himself as feeling emotion. The simplest epical form is seen
emerging out of lyrical literature when the artist prolongs and broods upon
himself as the centre of an epical event and this form progresses till the
centre of emotional gravity is equidistant from the artist himself and from
others. The narrative is no longer purely personal. The personality of the
artist passes into the narration itself, flowing round and round the persons and
the action like a vital sea ... The dramatic form is reached when the vitality
which has flowed and eddied round each person fills every person with such
vital force that he or she assumes a proper and intangible esthetic life. The
personality of the artist, at first a cry or a cadence or a mood and then a
fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself out of existence,
impersonalises itself, so to speak.
This evolutionary theory of literary forms
results in implicit evaluation, as Stephen concludes that the dramatic artist
accomplishes "a mystery" like that of "the God of the
creation" and, like God, the artist
remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible,
refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails. [1]
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man was published in 1916;
modern literary theory has generally conformed to the Flaubertian model
embraced by Joyce's hero. Imagism exhorted us to have "no ideas but in
things;" T.S. Eliot stated that "the more perfect the artist, the
more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which
creates ;" and "New Critics" like W.K. Wimsatt scorned any
reader so naive as to commit the "intentional fallacy."[2] Later rearguard attacks by people like
Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton, writers of what came to be called
"confessional poetry," did little to disturb the overall consensus
that biography had nothing to do with literature, and that the lyric
"I" was simply a speaker: a
persona and not a person. Recourse to interpretative information not directly
accessible from the literary work itself was taboo; in fact, whereas the 19th
century had mourned our lack of juicy gossip about Shakespeare, the 20th
century heaved a collective sigh of relief that literary criticism could study
the works in a blessed absence of knowledge about the man.
These days, the mania for
impersonality has gone a lot farther than anything presaged by Stephen
Daedalus's aesthetic idealism. The radical scepticism of French philosophy has
led to widespread denial not only that we can ever determine the author's
intentions in a text, but even that the author can have intentions, or ultimately embody them in language. On the
contrary, critics chortle, language is doomed from the start to be an
self-enclosed system with no referentiality and therefore no possibility of expressing "a cry or
a cadence or a mood" except as an absence, a deferral, a not-being
heralded by symbols. The twentieth century fascination with semiotics has made
Stephen's initial premise-–that emotion may actually be expressed in a lyric—seem
hopelessly ingenuous. Language is now seen as a system of conventions which
constrains its users, in thought as
well as in speech or writing, to conventional meanings. The Derridean mantra is
"from the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs."[3]
Poetry, we are
admonished, is doubly removed from unmediated reality. Not only is it
linguistically determined, but it's not even a genuine utterance. That is to
say that:
A poem is never spoken, not even by the poet
himself. It is always re-cited; for whatever its relation to words the poet could have spoken, it has, as a poem, no
initial historical occurrence. What the poet composes as a text is not a verbal
act but rather a linguistic structure that becomes, through being read or
recited, the representation of a
verbal act.[4]
Obviously there has been a continuous line of development from Joyce to
Derri-dada. But something seems to have been lost along the way, some
underlying conviction of the power of art to move, to teach and to delight. In
my more cynical moments, I can only see the academic respectability of
post-structuralist theory as the natural result of the publish-or-perish
industry; armed with all this new magic language, a whole generation of careerists
can churn out endless articles proving that any author did not/ could not write
what he or she set out to write but instead, wrote something which no other
critic but the current one has had the good sense to understand. Moreover, in dethroning the Author,
Deconstruction has simply dropped the ermine mantle of Authority onto the
heretofore stooped and tweed-clad shoulders of the Critic.
Nonetheless, there's a
good deal of indisputable sanity in the contemporary view of literature, a
salutary rejection of the "Great Ideas of Great Men" approach, and a
bracing insistence that we really pay attention to how literature is made, how it does what it does. Anyone who's
ever written a poem, and most who read poetry with attention, will agree that
the deictics of a poem (the orientational markers like pronouns and adverbs,
"you" and "I," "here" and "there,"
"now" and "then") do not have referentiality. They are
essentially relational, helping us to construct the situation of the poem,
which, whatever its origin, once written about is timeless and unlocalized.
Each reader will construe the deictics somewhat differently; and knowing the
"I" was really Willie
Yeats, "now" was 1916, and "here" was Dublin, is the least
important part of the poem's reality. It's an extra that can give any poem an
added frisson, but the truly good poem has to stand on its own feet (bad pun)
and provide everything necessary for the reader's experience within its own
confines.
Having
conceded all this, have I also necessarily relinquished my profound conviction
that I can hear the authentic voice of an author speaking from his or her felt
experience? When I am powerfully moved
by a poem am I only experiencing a psycho-linguistic response to
neuro-linguistic stimuli? Can I never faithfully attend to someone else's
being, someone else's passion moving in words? Here, for example, is a poem by
Denise Levertov which states that we cannot hear each other's music. Why then
do I feel its rhythm so profoundly on my own pulse?
Each life spins
into its own
orbit - rain
of meteor showers, sparkle of -
some
brittle desire, is it?
the
stab of deep pain?
Not without tearing
a few fibres,
the magnet forces
pull apart. I. He. Being
is not
referential.
I wake: instant recollection - a shadow
threatens my son's life.
Others slide their elongations toward his spirit.
My
being, unconformable
to his
perception,
moves on. Awake, I keep waking.
He survives
and leaves, moving
away from it.
Again waking, I stretch a hand out
to stop the warning clock.
Time
is another country.
Squinting toward light:
a tree has
filled it
with green diamonds. Or there's the air, bemused:
newfallen snow.
Shock waves of a music
I don't
hear
as you
don't hear mine.
How they
beat on the sea-wall![6]
"Shock
waves of a music I don't hear": not a bad description of what I'm after.
Even if "Being/ is not referential" and therefore "I" and
"He" are simply conventional gestures towards infinitely unstable,
ultimately unknowable subjects, there is something shared in the experience of
being which enables us to understand each other: to pick up the shock waves if
not the music. If you've read this far you must be getting something out of my
language; for me to keep on writing, I must believe not only that I have
something to say but that it's possible to say it. And when I say
"you" and "I," we're both clear about who's on which side
of the dialogue: "I" am the writer; "You" are the reader.
What I
"intended" to write when I began this piece was some reflections on
the widespread use of a device I have called in my title the second person
impersonal. I was pondering the ubiquity in the contemporary lyric of a
"you" who is not the
reader; that is, who is not the object of direct address as in so many
traditional love poems, elegies and satires, but, rather, is a kind of
universal abstraction of the speaker.
Open any literary magazine: there are dozens of poems written in this voice.
"You are walking down the street in your home town" or "You
didn't mean it/ but you did it anyway" or "you remember the girl you
once loved/ her small hands," and on and on. Of course, the device may be
observed in many literatures, and in other genres beside poetry. To take an
obvious recent example, Jay McInerary's glossy bestseller, Bright Lights, Big City, is written not only in the second person
but in the present tense. I suspect this rhetorical stance had as much to do
with the book's popularity as did its deadpan humour and world-weary decadence;
readers were not only invited to identify with the Hemingwayesque protagonist
in his search for love and honour among a new lost generation, they were
apparently required to do so by the
book's presentation of the action. "You walk into the bar. There is no one
there you know."
In thinking about this device, I found myself necessarily considering contemporary views of the presentation of self in language. These meanderings,
some of which I've inflicted upon you above, lead me to conclude that the lyric "you" is not simply a fad , just as Deconstruction is not simply a fad. Both are
profound reflections of the pervasive scepticism of our age.
"If you consult
the polestar for the truth
of your present
position, you will learn that you have no position"
a) It is egotistical to
assert that I know anything
b) I can't know
anything anyway; the world is unknowable
c) "I"- the
subject - do not exist
d) all of the above
The
second person impersonal may be seen as a natural development of the idiomatic
"you" of proverb lore and general observation. Susanna Moodie, for
example, uses it frequently when describing landscape such as anyone might
view:
Eastward, the view down the St. Lawrence towards
the Gulf is the finest of all, scarcely surpassed by anything in the world.
Your eye follows the long range of lofty mountains until their blue summits are
bended and lost in the blue of the sky.
Some of these, partially cleared round the base, are sprinkled over with neat
cottages, and the green slopes that spread around them are covered with flocks
and herds. The surface of the splendid river is diversified with islands of
every shape and size...[7]
All
Hallow's Eve
At sunset the low hills
turn blue
and the thin wail of a
coyote rises
like a trail of smoke
above a campfire.
Halfway to Medicine Hat
a fox melts through the
dark
and leads her litter
out into the cool
night air. Mice sift
through the grass.
Owls ride the long
drafts in from the riverbanks.
Along the road the
gravel crunches.
Then you stop and it's
like
a switch had been
flicked off.
All still. All quiet
under the night.[8]
What is interesting to consider is exactly where the slippage from "you" (meaning the general observer) to "you" (meaning "me") takes place. Even in Maltman's
poem, despite its determined objectivity, one can't help seeing the "you" as, partly, an "I;" tht is, as a speaker self-observed. But there is also space for the
reader to project herself into the shoes of the protagonist.
In
another short lyric, this one by Roo Borson, the images again are convincingly
universal, the situation equally so. Both poems are set outdoors, in the
autumn, as night falls; both note analogous details such as the wheeling flight
of birds over bodies of water. Both set the scene, and then acknowledge the
presence of an observing figure in the landscape, this figure being presented
in the second person. And yet the tone at the end of this second poem is
decidedly more personal than that of the first. Here "you" reads very
strongly as "me," even though the device of the second person
encourages reader identification.
It is dusk. The birds sweep low to the lake and then dive
up. The wind picks a few leaves off the ground
and turns them into wheels that roll
a little way and then collapse. There's nothing like branches
planted against the sky to remind you
of the feel of your feet on the earth, the way your hands
sometimes touch each other. All those memories,
you wouldn't want them over again, there's no point.
What's next, you ask yourself.
you ask it ten thousand times.[9]
Two
short, almost transparent lyrics, both built principally of unpretentious
images, both in the second person. Am I reading too much into them to feel a
difference in degree - if not in kind - in the way the second-person pronoun is
used? Look again.
In the first piece the
second-person pronoun is used only once, to describe the action of the protagonist. Once "you" stops crunching
gravel underfoot the landscape is completely silent. The title of the poem
provides an eerie subtext for this world which is otherwise observed purely
naturalistically, and may be taken as an indication of what "you"
feel in such a place at such a time. But nothing else is interiorized.
In
the Borson piece, by contrast, the movement from outside to inside begins as
early as the fifth line. More than half the poem is about what "you"
feel, and the personal emphasis is clear from verbal repetition:
"you," "your," "your," "you',"
"yourself," "your." So although both poems start off in
accurate description of a landscape as night falls, even though they have some
parallel imagery, and though both are set in the autumn ("All Hallow's
Eve" is October 31st; "Ten Thousand" draws our attention to the
leaves picked up by the wind), they feel
very different. Maltman's poem ends with us listening, attentively, to what's
out there. It doesn't ask the question - "What's next?"- with which
Borson's poem concludes, much less asking it "ten thousand times,"
because the poem's interest is not in the intangible yearning and
dissatisfaction of the persona. The world of Maltman's poem is lively, densely
inhabited with non-human life: a coyote, a fox with her litter, mice and owls.
But the world of Borson's poem has only a few unparticularized
"birds" which, like the leaves passively rolled by the wind, engage
in repetitive circular motions as they fly over the lake. In other words, this
landscape only gives back what "you" bring to it.
Well, I could go on,
but I think I've made my point. The way the second person is used in each of
these poems is intimately related to every other element in each poem; no
literary device stands on its own. So we cannot simply isolate a convention and
say "this is what it does and this is why it's used," since it will
be used dozens of different ways and subtly altered in each usage. I've already
betrayed my theoretical bias at numerous points in this essay, especially by my
use of suspiciously old-fashioned terms like "tone" and
"feeling." But to me this is
what is worth talking about when we talk about poetry, why topics like
variations on the word "you" are interesting and important.
Linguistics may provide us with a new terminology for literary conventions, new
perspectives on syntax and semantics, and we should certainly use what comes to
hand. But I remain dubious about any theory of literature which doesn't start
where Stephen Daedalus starts: with "an instant of emotion", and with
an authorial voice. So I'll end here, suggesting that you out there, you the
reader, carry these investigations a little further. Such things concern you intimately.
[2]
The first statement of Imagist principles was Ezra Pound's essay
"Imagism" published in Poetry, March 1913. Denying that
Imagism was a movement with a manifesto, Pound nonetheless explained its main
principles, the first of which was "Direct treatment of the 'thing'
whether subjective or objective." The slogan "No ideas but in
things" developed later, and may be found in William Carlos Williams' poem
"A Sort of a Song" published in The Wedge, 1944, and in his Selected
Poems: 1912-1962 (NY; New Directions, 1969). T.S. Eliot's essay
"Tradition and the Individual Talent" is included in Selected
Essays: 1917-1932 (NY: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1932). W.K. Wimsatt, Jr.
and H.M. Beardsley published "The Intentional Fallacy," in The
Sewanee Review in 1946; it was reprinted in Wimsatt's classic, The
Verbal Icon (Lexington, Ky: University of Kentucky Press, 1954).
[3]
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (1967); trans. Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p.50.
[4]
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relationship of
Literature to Language, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.31.
[5] If
in spite of the glamour of post-structuralist theory we persist in believing
that personal experience exists and that poetry can convey both emotion and
intention, we will find relief in the intellectually respectable theories of
Julia Kristeva. She shuts the author firmly outside the front door of language
and syntax, but welcomes the author in through the backdoor of "the
semiotic"--the pressure of "drives" which makes itself known in
poetry by transgressions of syntactic and linguistic convention. See Revolution
in Poetic Language (1974); trans. Margaret Waller, (NY: Columbia University
Press, 1984)